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INDUCING A REMEDY OR COURTING A SOLUTION? A 
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE P2P 
DILEMMA 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In June 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court proposed the latest resolution to 
peer-to-peer (P2P) copyright infringement in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.1  The Court held that Grokster could be secondarily liable 
for the copyright infringement of its users, even if the software was capable of 
substantial non-infringing uses.2  The Court had granted certiorari in Grokster 
to clear legal misconceptions lower courts had developed in offering their own 
solutions.3 
These misconceptions first began with A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
in which the Ninth Circuit held Napster liable for secondary copyright 
infringement by utilizing its own judicially crafted criteria.4  Three years later, 
the Ninth Circuit, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 
absolved Grokster, which offered Napster-compliant file sharing software, of 
any wrongs associated with copyright infringement by applying its previously 
established criteria found in Napster.5  Copyright holders were furious, 
especially because the Ninth Circuit’s Grokster decision arrived at a different 
conclusion than the Seventh Circuit, which had applied its own unique 
interpretation of the law in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation,6 even though all 
three companies—Napster, Grokster, and Aimster—distributed software that 
allowed the direct infringement of copyrights.7 
Surely academics will debate the substantive merits of the Court’s most 
recent decision, but, as many copyright and intellectual property enthusiasts 
are aware, the Court’s decision was only the latest proposed adaptation to 
copyright law.  Before the Court stepped in to remedy this quagmire, Sen. 
 
 1. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 2780; see also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 442 (1984). 
 3. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775. 
 4. 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 5. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158–60, 1164, 
1166 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 6. 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 7. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158; Aimster, 334 F.3d. at 645; Napster 239 F.3d at 1013. 
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Orrin Hatch introduced legislation designed to negate and neutralize the 
implications of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Grokster.8  By introducing the 
Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004 (the Induce Act),9 Hatch 
reacted to the swelling of dissension emanating from the copyright industry in 
the aftermath of the Ninth Circuit’s disposition of the Grokster case.10  
Ferociously advocated for by “copyright holders,” the Induce Act was also 
diametrically opposed by other interests—those that disapproved of this 
proposed application of an additional form of secondary liability to P2P 
software providers.11  This loosely formed group, including “innovators” and 
“Internet users,” with their recent victory in hand in the Ninth Circuit, kept the 
copyright holders at bay by stalling the legislation until the end of the 
congressional session, even though copyright holders ultimately received a 
favorable ruling in the Supreme Court’s decision.12 
What is largely ignored is the process by which these groups shifted this 
conflict from the courts, to the legislature, back to the courts, and perhaps back 
to the legislature—a seemingly ineffective method to influence the evolution 
of copyright law.  Group behavior, when examined within a law-making 
context, receives substantial academic attention, specifically from cross-over 
political scientists and economists.13  The evolution of this thought culminates 
in public choice theory, which analyzes government and group action and 
interaction through the basic assumptions of economics,14 hypothesizing that 
groups will maximize their benefits while deflating costs.15  A myriad of 
methods are used to increase benefits and decrease costs, but all of these 
methods are affected by the particular institution that the group decides to 
operate under; a phenomenon central to comparative institutional analysis, 
which seeks to determine the most efficient institution to target for a favorable 
policy solution.16 
Comparative institutional analysis can be used in a predictive manner by 
forecasting the “different outcomes that will arise in various institutional 
settings based on the actors’ incentives in each setting,”17  as well as in a 
normative manner, by determining the institution that should be utilized by 
 
 8. 150 CONG. REC. S7189 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 9. S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 10. 150 CONG. REC. S7192 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 11. See infra Part IV.A. 
 12. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005). 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 
(1991) [hereinafter FARBER & FRICKEY, LAW]. 
 15. See id. at 14–15. 
 16. Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of 
Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 575 (2001). 
 17. Id. 
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groups to attain a particular social goal, but nonetheless requires choices based 
on the costs and the benefits of the actions necessary to influence different 
institutions.18 
This Note seeks to examine, through a comparative institutional analysis, 
the utilization of certain institutions by these disparate interests, and to make 
an assessment as to which particular institution would be best suited to 
maximize these groups’ resources in their battle for the proper standard for 
secondary liability of copyright infringement.  In Part II, this Note will 
examine public choice theory and its evolution generally, and then, more 
specifically, the tenets of comparative institutional analysis.  Part III will 
discuss the controversy surrounding Grokster and the Induce Act, 
concentrating on the actions of the opposing groups, and how their interactions 
led to the demise of effective legislative bargaining.  Finally, Part IV will 
examine the institutions utilized by the factions and will conclude by arguing 
that the current legislative and judicial battles forced by copyright holders 
actually led to the inefficient uses of their resources. 
II.  THE INSTITUTIONS 
Comparative institutional analysis “predicts the different outcomes that 
will arise in various institutional settings based on the actors’ incentives in 
each setting . . . [and] chooses the best institution by determining the outcome 
that best furthers a particular social policy goal.”19  Neil Komesar’s 
“participation-centered approach” to comparative institutional analysis is 
instructive because it focuses on the actions of the participants20 and assumes a 
“number of plausibly efficient scenarios.”21  These scenarios only become 
possible when interested parties advocate for a particular goal, and will only do 
so in a particular forum where the benefits outweigh the costs.22  Certain 
institutions, such as the legislature, the market, and the courts, allocate 
different benefits, which require differing costs, and therefore, the choice of 
the respective institution becomes an important decision for motivated actors. 
A. The Legislature 
The study of the effects of groups on our political process is by no means a 
modern discourse; indeed, our constitutional structure was designed to limit the 
power of factions, to keep any group from demanding a disproportionate 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.; see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS 
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
 20. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 97. 
 21. Id. at 28. 
 22. Freiwald, supra note 16, at 576. 
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amount of political power, which would thwart our young democracy.23  This 
distrust of factions and its corresponding minoritarian influence has influenced 
some thinkers, while others perceive this minoritarian influence as promoting 
democracy.24 
Interest group theorists, when hypothesizing about the effects of interest 
groups and their corresponding minoritarian influence, generally argue that 
these groups either promote democracy, by operating under the tenets of 
pluralism, or limit democracy, as theorized by economists.25  Pluralism, in 
conceptualizing that “power is widely dispersed among many separate groups, 
all held in check by the public and by each other,”26 perceives group pressure 
as resulting in the promotion of democratic values.27  Implicit in this theory are 
certain assumptions about the formation of groups and the group behavior 
itself that help to deconstruct group tendencies and analyze the distribution of 
power that culminates in the democratic passage of legislation.  A major 
assumption of pluralism is that power is dispersed among many groups, with 
coalitions of groups operating in distinct areas of policy making.28 
Part of the reason for this dispersal of power . . . is that many different 
resources of power exist in our society . . . wealth, expertise, access to the 
media, prestige, position in a major institution—each of which may be decisive 
in one area but not in others.29 
 
 23. Fears of the effects of interest groups were present even before the Constitution was 
ratified.  In a series of articles, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay anonymously 
editorialized in support of the proposed Constitution.  In the tenth article, Madison wrote: 
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens . . . that 
our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of 
rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice 
and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and 
overbearing majority. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also Jack M. Beermann, Interest Group Politics 
and Judicial Behavior: Macey’s Public Choice, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 184 (1991). 
 24. I am not attempting to say which theory is right, or even that the following discussion 
and analysis will be guided by any one theory exclusively.  Rather, the following discussion of 
interest group theory generally highlights several incidents within the peer-to-peer (P2P) 
filesharing debate that are instrumental to choosing a particular institution as the most desirable 
from a group perspective. 
 25. Beermann, supra note 23, at 188–97.  Beermann states: “Public choice theory depends 
most fundamentally on the assumption that government officials, parties regulated by 
government, and all private citizens, when they engage in political activity, are acting out of self-
interest and not altruistically.”  Id. at 188; see also FARBER & FRICKEY, LAW, supra note 14, at 
13–14. 
 26. JANET A. FLAMMANG ET AL., AMERICAN POLITICS IN A CHANGING WORLD 140 (1990). 
 27. See id. at 155. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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Thus, although a group may not be well financed, it may have a large number 
of members, or it may have a membership that is well-respected in a particular 
field. 
But these resources themselves do not translate into legislative success.  
Ideally, “representatives would measure the will of the people as expressed 
through groups and direct public policy in accordance with their best estimate 
of overall societal sentiment.”30  Nevertheless, government actors must have 
some incentive to listen to one group over another; the resources a group can 
offer make it influential with lawmakers.31  Groups that represent a large 
number of members can aid the legislator in re-election by promising favorable 
portrayal within the group, which would theoretically translate into votes.32  
Groups that have large coffers can offer the legislator, or withhold from him or 
her pending cooperation, large amounts of money to finance reelection 
campaigns.33 
Implicit in maintaining the “balance of the system” is an inherent 
competition between groups.  According to pluralists, even if a group has more 
resources than a competing group, that competing group will, by necessity, 
reorganize to an extent to restore balance to the system thereby maintaining 
certain necessary democratic principles.34  Assuming groups have a resource 
that is important to legislators, like money from wealthy groups or electoral 
support from highly populated groups, each group then possesses a finite 
amount of influence on the legislative process.  Through bargaining and 
compromise, facilitated by the legislators and other governmental officials, the 
groups wield their power only as much as a competing group allows.35 
Also important to the balance of the system is a group’s relative 
accessibility to the political process, especially when a group feels strongly 
about an issue.36  The theory assumes that when a particular group is too 
powerful, another group will form to offset the original group’s power and 
 
 30. Beermann, supra note 23, at 191. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See ROBERT L. LINEBERRY ET AL., GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND 
POLICY 218 (2d ed. 1995). 
 35. See JEFFREY M. BERRY, THE INTEREST GROUP SOCIETY 10–11 (3d ed. 1997); see also 
DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC 
OPINION 534 (1953) (“Such partisan activities . . . consist of aid to candidates for Congress even 
in districts where the formal members of these groups are few.  Such efforts may eventually 
create a situation in which legislators are responsible to more than a purely local constituency.”).  
Generally, as used here, a competing group is one that takes an opposite position to a group that is 
promoting some policy change. 
 36. See W. LANCE BENNETT, INSIDE THE SYSTEM: CULTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND POWER IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 21 (1994). 
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influence, thus maintaining a democratic check on any one group’s ability to 
implement a comprehensive design.37 
Empirical studies supported these conceptions of group behavior.  In 1935, 
E. E. Schattschneider, in analyzing the Smoot–Hawley Tariff of 1930, 
concluded that participating groups’ economic objectives largely shaped the 
ensuing legislation.38  Robert Dahl, in his study of New Haven politics, found 
pluralist theory helpful in analyzing the behavior of various groups and 
political leaders as there was no one group that dominated the political 
process.39 
Later developments in the political arena, however, led to the questioning 
of certain tenets of pluralism, including the democratic assumption of equal 
access to power.40  Pluralism, holding true to democratic principles, demands 
that “government is open to new groups who enter the competition for 
power . . . all groups have equal chance to compete effectively . . . and . . .  
people can organize effectively and be heard when they feel their interests are 
on the line.”41  Several real-world events suggested otherwise.  “The civil 
rights movement . . . made it all too clear that blacks were wholly outside the 
normal workings of the political system. . . . [T]he inadequacy of pluralist 
theory to explain the position of blacks in society became increasingly 
evident.”42  It was apparent to social science theorists that pluralism did not 
account for the excessive privilege and governmental influence of particular 
interest groups.43 
Interest group liberalism, a pluralist-based theory that attempted to plug the 
holes left in the previous conception of pluralism, “sees as both necessary and 
good a policy agenda that is accessible to all organized interests and makes no 
independent judgment of their claims. . . . [I]t defines the public interest as a 
result of the amalgamation of various claims.”44  Building on the assumptions 
of interest groups and their key role in the formulation of policy, interest group 
liberalism’s analysis emphasized that “the role of government is one of 
insuring access to the most effectively organized, and of ratifying the 
agreements and adjustments worked out among the competing leaders.”45  
 
 37. See FLAMMANG ET AL., supra note 26, at 159, 164; see also BENNETT, supra note 36, at 
21; LINEBERRY ET AL., supra note 34, at 218. 
 38. See E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND THE TARIFF 16–17, 288–89 
(1935). 
 39. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN 
AMERICAN CITY (1961). 
 40. See id. at 1 (referring to American beliefs in democracy and equality). 
 41. See BENNETT, supra note 36, at 21 (emphasis omitted). 
 42. BERRY, supra note 35, at 13. 
 43. See id. at 14. 
 44. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 51 (2d ed. 1979). 
 45. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Toward these ends, the relationship between the government and the groups 
often becomes too intimate: since the legislators cannot choose a solution to a 
problem, because they rely on the competing groups for resources like money 
or votes, policy stagnation often results.46  Thus, if the competing groups 
cannot fashion a solution, a solution will, theoretically, not be had. 
These attempts to mold a theory to best fit those events that occurred in the 
political world while keeping its democratic gloss intact eventually led to the 
demise of these pluralist theories.47  Increasingly, political scientists began to 
challenge the basic democratic belief that groups were at the center of political 
decision-making.48  By the late 1950s, it seemed that many groups were 
“underfinanced, poorly organized, overworked, and often counterbalanced by 
each other’s efforts. . . . [T]he lobbyist functioned more as a ‘service bureau’ 
for legislators than as an ‘agent of direct persuasion.’”49  Instead of scrapping 
interest group theory altogether, however, economists re-focused the 
discussion by postulating that economic realities cause groups to operate anti-
democratically.50 
The formation of legislation from an economic perspective is best 
understood when “legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other 
goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups that derive the 
greatest value from it, regardless of overall social welfare . . . .”51  The means 
with which legislative goods are acquired consist of promises for electoral 
support, financial support, or informational support, much like the pluralists 
had hypothesized.52 
Public choice theory emphasizes the role of the interest group, assuming 
that since the rational legislator mostly desires to get re-elected, it is the 
interest group that offers comparatively more benefits than a competing group 
that emerges victorious, often with anti-democratic results.53  But there are 
 
 46. See LINEBERRY ET AL., supra note 34, at 220. 
 47. See generally Beermann, supra note 23, at 189–90. 
 48. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. 
REV. 873, 884–85 (1987). 
 49. Id. at 885–86. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the 
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982). 
 52. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 230 (1986).  Certainly, large 
groups have many members who ideally vote for politicians who support their views.  See id.  
Wealthy groups are able to not only make campaign contributions, but also to employ legislators 
for speaking engagements and sometimes just make outright bribes.  See id. 
 53. FARBER & FRICKEY, LAW, supra note 14, at 23.  However, this model negates the role of 
the voter, postulating that “[b]ecause voters don’t know much about a legislator’s conduct, 
elections may turn on financial backing, publicity, and endorsements. . . . [This theory] assume[s] 
that ideology, defined simply as individual beliefs about the public interest, influences neither 
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costs associated with group formation and these groups’ subsequent wielding 
of influence, mainly information and transaction costs. 
The initial transaction cost of any group is the initial influx of capital 
necessary to ensure group formation.54  Specifically, transaction costs “are the 
costs of organizing these similarly situated individuals into effective political 
coalitions.”55  Group formation is closely followed chronologically by group 
organization, which requires the identification of members who share the 
group’s position, and then education of those members when potentially 
harmful legislation is proposed.56  Then, groups must acquire information on a 
particular issue and information on how to influence the legislative process. 
“The more complex and extensive the political process, the more difficult it is 
to understand its rules and discover its channels of influence—both formal and 
informal.”57 
Not only are there certain costs associated with group formation, but 
certain obstacles must be overcome through the expenditure of additional 
resources.  Mancur Olson, in his seminal work on the free-rider dilemma, 
posited that the average person is not likely to actually influence political 
decisions,58 as the majority of people do not possess the resources to actually 
influence political outcomes.59  “While large groups of relatively impecunious 
individuals might theoretically pool their resources to defeat the wealthier 
interests, the costs of organizing will usually outweigh the potential benefits of 
the influence sought.”60  The group must convince the previously located 
individuals that their action and support is imperative to the common goal. 
Another impediment to group formation is the irrationality of pursuing 
benefits derived from public policy.61  “Most public policies are public goods, 
that is, once a policy is produced, everyone, not just participants in the political 
process, is free to enjoy the benefits of the policy.”62  This in turn destroys 
most incentive for participation in influential groups, as it is often difficult to 
restrict the benefits to only the members of the group, and thus creates the free 
rider problem.63  “[V]oluntary groups will not organize around policies that 
affect large numbers of individuals . . . [g]roup membership will not, therefore, 
 
voters nor legislators. . . . [S]elf-interest is the exclusive causal agent in politics.”  Id. at 23–24. 
 54. Macey, supra note 52, at 229. 
 55. Id. 
 56. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 71–72. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Beermann, supra note 23, at 194 (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 194–95. 
 62. Id. at 195. 
 63. Beermann, supra note 23, at 195. 
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represent democracy in any relevant sense, but will instead reflect interests that 
happen to be able to overcome the impediments to organizing.”64  Overall, pre-
existing groups of like-minded individuals will more effectively influence the 
political process than otherwise dispersed individuals.65 
Information costs also must be taken into consideration when evaluating 
the effectiveness of group formation or issue involvement.  Information costs 
are “incurred by an individual or group in the process of discovering the 
impact of an issue on the wealth of that individual or group, as well as the costs 
of identifying similarly situated individuals or groups who are likely to share 
the costs of obtaining political action.”66 
Groups attempting to influence a legislator on a particular issue must incur 
the costs of educating the legislator on the group’s position.67  Controlling the 
flow of information benefits not only the legislator, by giving justifications for 
a particular policy position, but the group itself.  Particularly, interest groups, 
especially when dealing with complex legislation, are able to “distort” the 
thinking of the legislator by providing information supportive of the group’s 
policy goal.68  It follows then that groups that have already organized are again 
in an advantageous position when compared to those groups that must incur 
substantial transaction and information costs to support or oppose particular 
legislation.69 
However, information costs vary depending upon the targeted institution.  
For instance, the structural characteristics of the institution, such as “size and 
population of the jurisdiction, size of the legislature (number of legislators), 
frequency of election, size and scope of the legislative agenda, and the rules of 
the legislature (and agencies),” have an impact on how a group will expend its 
resources.70 
Since resources are limited, there is a threshold amount that groups will 
“pay” for particular legislation.  Assuming that groups are pursuing public 
policies that do not cost them more in taxes or any other sort of wealth, groups 
will strive for a policy benefit that exceeds their costs, which is known as 
 
 64. Id. at 195. 
 65. Macey, supra note 52, at 229.  This is not to say that large groups cannot be effective.  
The main assumption of public choice theory is that political actors behave rationally.  If certain 
members of a group are funding the group, and the desired policy is a collective good, i.e., a good 
shared by a large number of people, those members of the group will be spending more resources 
than they are receiving, which, discounting ideological fervor, is an irrational behavior.  See 
FARBER & FRICKEY, LAW, supra note 14, at 23. 
 66. Macey, supra note 52, at 229. 
 67. Id. at 230–31. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market 
Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 47 (1988). 
 70. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 73. 
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“rent-seeking.”71  Accordingly, the higher the benefit to the group, the more 
the group will be willing to spend.  “Rent seeking is the purposeful pursuit, 
through the political process, of above-normal profits.  By engaging in rent-
seeking activities, private parties ‘compete for artificially contrived 
transfers.’”72  Those groups will continue to “pay” legislators up to the amount 
of the total benefit of the legislation, or to the point where the group is no 
longer making a profit on the transaction, thereby defeating their attempt to 
rent-seek.73  Therefore, rational legislators acting in their self interest will 
advance particular legislation from groups that have low transactional and 
informational costs and tend to ignore those groups whose costs are relatively 
higher, as they will theoretically be less effective.74 
Komesar’s conception of group interaction focuses intently on the 
resources of the group and negates the interest of the legislator—as the 
legislator, either self-interested or publicly interested, will always react to 
group pressure.75  As such, Komesar posits that a well-organized and well-
informed small group will be more influential than a poorly organized and a 
poorly formed large group regardless of the legislator’s interests; but, when 
“the majoritarian influence grows, we can get a countervailance of sorts 
between the two forces and, with it, political outcomes that are more 
‘balanced’ than predicted by a model that focused on only [minority 
groups].”76 
B. The Market 
The market, like the political system, serves as an avenue for the 
achievement of social goals or interests.77  “As with the political process, this 
focus on the mass of participants hardly suggests that all participants are 
created equal.  Some people or entities participate more or more effectively.”78  
 
 71. Michael E. DeBow, The Social Costs of Populist Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective, 
14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 214 (1991). 
 72. Id. at 214–15. 
 73. Id.  Surely, legislators can act in a way not consistent with powerful groups; Komesar 
refers to it as “slippage.”  KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 57. 
 74. Macey, supra note 52, at 230. 
 75. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 64. 
 76. Id. at 75.  But, “[w]here minoritarian influence predominates . . . the resulting broad-
based legislation may be illusory.”  Id. 
Mobilizing for political action often prompts opposing groups to mobilize in opposition.  
The ultimate outcome is often no action, or a messy compromise that is not terribly 
satisfactory, or even a result that leaves the group that moved first worse off than it was 
before it attempted to secure political action. 
Howard S. Erlanger & Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Political Faith, 22 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 959, 978 (1997). 
 77. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 98. 
 78. Id. at 99. 
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Use of the market requires significant transaction costs, as compared to the 
relative benefits received by the participants.79  Transaction costs are 
significantly dominated by information costs, which include the costs of 
acquiring and understanding essential information.80  Many of the same 
information costs discussed earlier apply, as groups attempting to solve a 
problem must first recognize the problem, determine the best solution to a 
problem, and then finally implement that solution.81  Other pertinent decisions 
include “the choice whether to subcontract an activity or to internalize it in a 
firm via vertical or conglomerate integration” and the process of distributing 
the goods or services.82 
The large numbers of participants necessary to reach a solution often make 
the minimization of transaction costs and the maximization of benefits 
difficult, as several intermediaries must usually be dealt with in bringing goods 
to a market.83  “[E]ven with a very confined distribution of impacts, the costs 
of transacting are not negligible and might deter either party from 
transacting. . . .”84 
However, much like groups in the legislature, groups in the market can 
rent-seek.  For example, advertising can be used to differentiate otherwise very 
similar products, producing artificial monopolies to the extent that the cost of 
the advertising does not exceed the benefits to the brand.85  As such, however, 
“these efficiency losses due to monopoly may well be dwarfed by the 
efficiency losses caused by the waste of resources expended on the advertising 
used to create these monopoly rents.”86  The success of the advertising, and in 
turn the rent-seeking, largely depends on the level of sophistication of the 
consumer: “[I]t is harder to fool [consumers when] higher stakes justify a 
greater willingness to obtain alternative sources of information or to obtain the 
sophistication necessary to critically examine any distorted information 
provided.”87 
C. The Judiciary 
The adjudicative process exhibits certain structural elements that determine 
its efficacy.  Courts have defined rules and requirements that determine 
participation, such as the requirements of standing and an actual case or 
 
 79. See Freiwald, supra note 16, at 601. 
 80. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 105–06. 
 81. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 82. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 107. 
 83. Id. at 100, 112. 
 84. Id. at 101. 
 85. See id. at 116. 
 86. Id. 
 87. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 117. 
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controversy.88  The court system is also significantly smaller in scope, tending 
only to solve a problem based on particular facts, and does not necessarily 
provide for the desired social benefit, as the ability of courts to fashion broad 
and long reaching relief is limited.89 
Komesar also highlights the contention that judges and juries may not be 
good decision-makers.  Specifically, judges may have trouble comprehending 
the factual situations in highly complex and technical litigation.90  Contributing 
to this potential ignorance is that judges are often insulated from information 
concerning the benefits and detriments to the public, starkly contrasted with 
legislators.91  Instead, judges “depend on others to convince them by evidence 
and reason, but they do not depend on these others for their jobs and 
livelihood.”92  However, this independence provides an essential advantage, as 
biases in other institutions are often avoided or reduced in the adjudicative 
process because of the many rules and standards employed by the judiciary.93 
While all three of these institutions are available to groups in pursuing 
their desired policy goal, some inevitably pose higher participation costs than 
others.  Further, the actions emanating from these institutions result in varying 
levels of benefits for the “victorious” conglomeration of interests.  The 
resulting actions from one institution may even have effects on the solutions of 
other institutions.  “[N]ot only may Congress be ill-suited to make a change, 
but, once it does, that decision may compromise the ability of other institutions 
to solve the problem.”94  This volleying of problems from one institution to the 
next is illustrated in the evolution of the legal conundrum of peer-to-peer (P2P) 
networks and secondary liability, and the inability of the current law to provide 
an acceptable remedy. 
III.  GROKSTER  V. THE INDUCE ACT 
The Supreme Court, in Grokster, reviewed the opinion of the Ninth 
Circuit, which held the P2P software provider Grokster free from liability even 
though it found that some P2P software “may have intentionally structured 
their businesses to avoid secondary liability for copyright infringement, while 
benefiting financially from the illicit draw of their wares.”95  The Induce Act 
 
 88. Id. at 123–26. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 138–39. 
 91. Id. at 141. 
 92. KOMESAR, supra note 19, at 141. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Freiwald, supra note 16, at 582. 
 95. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. 
Cal. 2003), aff’d, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).  Even though 
not part of the Ninth Circuit opinion, this quote from the District Court is instructive in 
illustrating the reasoning of the circuit court. 
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was introduced to amend section 501 of the Copyright Act to create a “new 
form” of secondary liability for intentionally inducing copyright infringement 
and to overrule the District Court’s decision and the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent 
affirmation.96 
The debate over the Induce Act, like most legislative battles, brought 
together a collection of groups that opposed the legislation as well as a 
collection of groups that endorsed the legislation.  For purposes of simplicity, 
these varying interests will be cataloged and discussed in this Note through the 
following labels: software distributors, who are fighting to ensure that 
secondary liability is not expanded to the extent that it would chill innovation 
of technology that has a legitimate and legal purpose but could be used for 
copyright infringement; Internet users, who are fighting for P2P technology 
that facilitates the downloading of copyrighted music and movies at lower than 
market prices; and copyright owners, who include the individual artists as well 
as the overarching labels,97 trade groups, and other industries aimed at stopping 
the worldwide infringement on copyrights.  The Internet users and software 
distributors have teamed up, for different reasons, to defeat the Induce Act, and 
to leave the copyright owners searching for an alternate solution. 
Part A of this section will discuss the evolution of copyright infringement, 
which was, until the recent barrage of attempted legislative efforts, generally 
judicially crafted.  Part B of this section will examine the Induce Act, written 
largely by legislators and numerous interested groups that have become 
involved in this process.  Parts C and D will discuss other institutional 
solutions to the development of online piracy, namely market and judicial 
solutions, respectively. 
A. Historical Analysis of Copyright Infringement 
Presently, the traditional cause of action for copyright owners against a 
secondary copyright infringer exists in common law, as the Copyright Act of 
1976 did not specifically codify any sort of secondary liability for copyright 
infringement.98  In Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists 
Management, Inc., the court held that when a concert manager knew that the 
musicians were to include performances of copyrighted compositions, the 
manager was both a contributory and vicarious infringer of the copyrights.99  
The court explained that “one who, with [1] knowledge of the infringing 
activity, [2] induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct 
 
 96. Michael Warnecke, Critics Fear ‘Induce Act’ Will Undo Sony; Could Perfect 10-Visa Be 
Wave of Future?, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., July 16, 2004, at 318, 318. 
 97. The labels usually own the copyright to reproduce the actual music. 
 98. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161–62 (2d 
Cir. 1971). 
 99. 443 F.2d at 1162–63. 
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of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”100  The court also 
elaborated on the doctrine of vicarious liability: “[A] person who has promoted 
or induced the infringing acts of the performer has been held jointly and 
severally liable as a ‘vicarious’ infringer, even though he has no actual 
knowledge that copyright monopoly is being impaired.”101  Noting that 
vicarious liability has its roots in the employment field, the court held that the 
liability should also exist in this situation, when the concert manager “[1] has 
the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and [2] also has a direct 
financial interest in such activities.”102 
The present clash between copyright owners and P2P software producers is 
not the first time that technology producers defended a product from a 
secondary liability claim.  In 1984 the Supreme Court decided Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., where owners of copyrighted 
television programs brought an infringement action against the manufacturers 
of videotape recorders.103  The Court noted that while the Copyright Act grants 
certain exclusive rights to the holder, “[a]ll reproductions of the work, 
however, are not within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner . . . [a]ny 
individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a ‘fair use’; the copyright 
owner does not possess the exclusive right to such a use.”104 
Because of Congress’s constitutional grant of power to regulate copyrights, 
the Court looked to contributory infringement under patent statutes so as not to 
expand the protections of copyrights without legislative guidance.105  “These 
cases deny the patentee any right to control the distribution of unpatented 
articles unless they are ‘unsuited for any commercial noninfringing use.’  
Unless a commodity ‘has no use except through practice of the patented 
method,’ the patentee has no right to claim that its distribution constitutes 
contributory infringement.”106  The Court held that because the VCR merely 
“time-shifted” television programs, which was actually encouraged by the 
copyright holders, it was capable of a substantial non-infringing use, and Sony 
could not be held liable when consumers used the VCR to make illegal copies 
of other copyrighted videos.107  The Court’s holding in Sony and its subsequent 
application varied among the circuits; while trying to hold true to the logic set 
forth in Sony, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits developed different methods to 
 
 100. Id. at 1162. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. 464 U.S. 417, 419–20 (1984). 
 104. Id. at 433. 
 105. See id. at 439. 
 106. Id. at 441. (citing Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198, 199 
(1980)). 
 107. Id. at 446, 456. 
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deal with contributory liability and the Sony defense of a “substantial 
noninfringing use.” 
The Ninth Circuit was first presented with the opportunity to weigh in on 
the application of Sony to P2P networks in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc.108  Napster, which facilitated the exchange of digital audio files over the 
internet (through these P2P networks), was alleged to vicariously and 
contributorily infringe on certain copyrights held by record companies.109  To 
use Napster, an individual would simply download the necessary software, 
which allowed the search for and transfer of exact copies of the digital audio 
files.110  The software enabled a user to “share” audio files on a computer by 
uploading the Napster-verified files to a Napster-controlled central database.111 
In finding Napster liable, the Ninth Circuit adopted the definition of 
contributory infringement from Gershwin: “one who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing 
conduct of another.”112  Finding that Napster had both actual and constructive 
knowledge of direct infringement, the court held that the first prong of the test 
for contributory infringement was met.113  Applying Sony, the court enunciated  
“a limited interpretation of the Sony rule, declining to interpret the ‘substantial 
noninfringing use’ test as an absolute shield against secondary liability.”114  
According to the court, the substantial noninfringing use is not restrained to 
current uses of the service, but instead should focus “on the proportion of 
current infringing use as compared to current and future noninfringing use.”115  
Thus, the Ninth Circuit developed a two-part knowledge test: if a defendant’s 
product is found to have substantial noninfringing uses, they will not be 
charged with constructive knowledge of infringement, but actual knowledge of 
infringement automatically satisfies this element despite substantial 
noninfringing uses.116 
As to the material contribution element, the district court concluded that 
“[w]ithout the support services defendant provides, Napster users could not 
find and download the music they want with the ease of which defendant 
 
 108. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 109. Id. at 1010–11. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1012. 
 112. Id. at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 113. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020.  The first element in a contributory copyright infringement 
case is actually direct infringement by a primary infringer, but this element is almost always 
undisputed in these cases, and is nevertheless not relevant to this Note’s discussion.  See Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 114. Elizabeth Miles, Note, In Re Aimster & MGM, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer-to-Peer and 
the Sony Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21, 27–28 (2004). 
 115. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021. 
 116. Miles, supra note 114, at 28. 
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boasts.”117  Thus, satisfying both of the elements of contributory infringement, 
the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s opinion, holding that Napster had 
committed contributory infringement of the plaintiff’s copyrights.118 
The court then moved to the vicarious liability of Napster, asking if the 
defendant “ha[d] the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and 
also ha[d] a direct financial interest in such activities.”119  The Ninth Circuit 
upheld the district court’s ruling that Napster had a direct financial interest in 
the infringing activity, noting that the “[f]inancial benefit exists where the 
availability of infringing material ‘acts as a “draw” for customers.’”120  The 
district court had relied on the finding that Napster’s future revenue is directly 
connected to the increase in registered users, and registered users increase as 
the “quality and quantity of available music increases.”121 
Even though the Ninth Circuit found that Napster’s “right and ability to 
supervise” is limited to the system’s architecture of uploaded files, the court 
nevertheless held that Napster “ha[d] the ability to locate infringing material 
listed on its search indices, and the right to terminate users’ access to the 
system,” and therefore held that the duty element of vicarious liability was 
satisfied as well.122 
However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision was not the last word on the 
application of copyright law to the unique situations of copyright infringement 
facilitated by the use of P2P networks.  In the case In re Aimster Copyright 
Litigation, the Seventh Circuit upheld an injunction, finding that Aimster was 
likely to be a contributory infringer.123  The use of the Aimster service, like the 
Napster service, required certain downloadable software, which allowed 
registered users to send messages back and forth with audio files attached.124  
The court found that the Aimster system had the following elements: 
[P]roprietary software that can be downloaded free of charge from Aimster’s 
Web site; Aimster’s server . . . which hosts the Web site and collects and 
organizes information obtained from the users but does not make copies of the 
swapped files themselves and that also provides the matching service described 
below; computerized tutorials instructing users of the software on how to use it 
 
 117. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 118. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022. 
 119. Id. (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 
1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 120. Id. at 1023 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263–64 (9th Cir. 
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 121. A&M Records, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902. 
 122. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1024. 
 123. 334 F.3d 643, 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 124. Id. at 646. 
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for swapping computer files; and “Club Aimster,” a related Internet service . . . 
that users . . . can join for a fee.125 
In discussing the “substantial non-infringing use” test, the Seventh Circuit 
reasoned that “the ability of a service provider to prevent its customers from 
infringing is a factor to be considered in determining whether the provider is a 
contributory infringer.”126  However, the court held that this factor is not 
controlling, as the court noted that if the “detection and prevention of the 
infringing uses would be highly burdensome,”127 then a balancing test is 
required, “[b]ut the balancing of costs and benefits is necessary only in a case 
in which substantial noninfringing uses, present or prospective, are 
demonstrated.”128  Unfortunately for Aimster, this test was never applied, as 
Aimster produced no evidence that the service had been used for a 
noninfringing use.129 
The Seventh Circuit also disagreed with the discussion of the knowledge 
prong of contributory infringement in Napster, stating that “the Ninth Circuit 
erred . . . in suggesting that actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a 
sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer.”130  
Nevertheless, the court still found that Aimster was willfully blind, satisfying 
the knowledge element, and was therefore a contributory infringer.131 
The Ninth Circuit had a chance to refine its application of Sony and 
secondary liability in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd.132  
The court began its analysis by distinguishing the different “architectures” of 
P2P systems.133  The first was a centralized indexing system that maintained a 
listing of the available files on a company-owned server, which Napster 
used.134  The second was a decentralized indexing system, where the company 
only maintained a list of available files on the network.135  The third was a 
“supernode” system, where there were no lists and each connected computer 
listed its available files.136 
The court continued by highlighting the substantial non-infringing use test 
that it elicited in Napster: 
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Thus, in order to analyze the required element of knowledge of infringement, 
we must first determine what level of knowledge to require.  If the product at 
issue is not capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing 
uses, then the copyright owner need only show that the defendant had 
constructive knowledge of the infringement.  On the other hand, if the product 
at issue is capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing 
uses, then the copyright owner must demonstrate that the defendant had 
reasonable knowledge of specific infringing files and failed to act on that 
knowledge to prevent infringement.137 
The court, finding that the software had substantial non-infringing uses, 
continued the analysis by determining if Grokster had reasonable knowledge of 
specific infringement.138  The court held that the decentralized structure of the 
network, which enabled the P2P sharing, did not provide Grokster actual, 
specific knowledge of infringement.139 
Moving to the material contribution prong of contributory infringement, 
the court noted that Grokster did not provide the site and facilities used for 
infringement.140  The court elaborated by stating that “it is the users of the 
software who, by connecting to each other over the internet, create the network 
and provide the access.  ‘Failure’ to alter software located on another’s 
computer is simply not akin to the failure to delete a filename from one’s own 
computer.”141  Therefore, the plaintiff had proved neither prong, and the court 
dismissed the claim that Grokster was liable for contributory copyright 
liability.142 
In analyzing Grokster’s vicarious liability and, more specifically, 
Grokster’s right and ability to supervise, the court noted that “[i]t does not 
appear from any of the evidence that either of the defendants has the ability to 
block access to individual users. . . . [They had] no ability to actually terminate 
access to file sharing functions.”143  The plaintiffs, arguing the willful 
blindness theory used by the Seventh Circuit, met opposition by the court: 
If the Software Distributors had a right and ability to control and supervise that 
they proactively refused to exercise, such refusal would not absolve them of 
liability. . . . However . . . there is no separate “blind eye” theory . . . that exists 
independently of the traditional elements of liability.144 
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 139. Id. at 1163. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1164. 
 143. Id. at 1165. 
 144. Id. at 1166. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] INDUCING A REMEDY OR COURTING A SOLUTION? 869 
Therefore, the court found that since there is no ability for Grokster to control 
the direct infringement, it was not vicariously liable.145 
At the end of the decision, the court discussed the Supreme Court’s 
reluctance in Sony to change the applicable laws when presented with a 
difficult case, stating “the Supreme Court has admonished us to leave such 
matters to Congress . . . the district court . . . properly declined the invitation to 
alter [applicable copyright law].”146  Congress heard the call of the court and 
introduced the Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act in an attempt to 
correct what was seen as an inconsistency in the application of secondary 
copyright infringement.147 
B. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act 
Aiming to answer the courts’ call for legislative guidance, Sen. Hatch and 
the Act’s co-sponsors originally introduced the Induce Act on June 22, 2004.148  
There have been two substantive drafts that will be discussed to illustrate the 
divide between the two sides of the debate and their respective interests. 
1. Analysis of Original Draft of the Induce Act 
Hatch, in his introduction of the bill, described the current state of affairs: 
“[I]t is illegal and immoral to induce or encourage children to commit crimes.  
Artists realize that adults who corrupt or exploit the innocence of children are 
the worst type of villains.”149  Sen. Leahy, who co-sponsored the Induce Act, 
insisted it would only target P2P software providers: 
[T]he bill will continue to promote the development of new technologies as it 
will not impose liability on the manufacturers of copying technology merely 
because the possibility exists for abuse . . . the makers of electronic 
equipment . . . the Internet service providers . . . have nothing to fear from this 
bill.150 
The Induce Act, which would have amended section 501 of Title 17 of the 
U.S. Code, contained three subsections: the first subsection defined 
“intentionally induces”; the second subsection added the new classification of 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1167. 
 147. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
 148. 150 CONG. REC. S7189 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 149. Id.  The discussion of the Induce Act’s language and subsequent congressional hearings 
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infra Part III.B.1.a–d (discussing criticisms of the Induce Act). 
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liability: intentional inducement; and the third subsection was a savings clause 
for the already established doctrines of secondary liability.151 
According to the bill, “intentionally induces” was defined as “intentionally 
aids, abets, induces, or procures, and intent may be shown by acts from which 
a reasonable person would find intent to induce infringement based upon all 
relevant information about such acts then reasonably available to the actor, 
including whether the activity relies on infringement for its commercial 
viability.”152  “Intentionally aids, abets, induces, or procures” was borrowed 
from the criminal code concerning copyright infringement.153  The second 
substantial part of this subsection introduced a reasonable person standard (a 
question of fact for a jury) into the equation of intentional inducement.154  
Finally, the bill described an infringing activity as one that “relies on 
infringement for its commercial viability,” intending to formulate the law in 
such a way as to treat services like Napster and Grokster equally.155 
The second subsection statutorily defined the intentional inducement form 
of liability,156 stating that “whoever intentionally induces any violation 
identified in subsection (a) shall be liable as an infringer.”157  The final section 
of the legislation notes that “[n]othing in this subsection shall enlarge or 
diminish the doctrines of vicarious and contributory liability for copyright 
infringement or require any court to unjustly withhold or impose any 
secondary liability for copyright infringement.”158  Sen. Hatch described this 
section as a “savings clause to ensure that it provides the ‘guidance’ courts 
have requested—not an iron-clad rule of decision for all possible future 
cases.”159 
Needless to say, this initial draft met a good deal of opposition from 
software distributors and Internet users, mostly through congressional 
testimony, the media, and the use of Internet sites, and generally focused on 
how the bill could chill innovation.160 
 
 151. Inducing Infringement of Copyrights Act of 2004, S. 2560, 108th Cong. (2004). 
 152. Id. at § 2. 
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 154. See id. 
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a. The Induce Act Does Not Adequately Change Existing Law 
The confusion concerning the application of law to P2P networks that, 
while operating differently, still enabled illegal infringement, exhibited the 
necessity for the Induce Act.  However, varying interpretations could render 
the bill useless,161 as some believe that the Induce Act would not change the 
Ninth Circuit’s result in Grokster.162  “The entertainment industry contends 
that Grokster . . . induce[d] infringement. . . [h]owever the Grokster court 
found no evidence of such seduction. . . . [T]he suit would probably fail at trial 
unless the industry could produce more solid evidence of intent to induce 
infringement.”163 
Instead of changing existing law, it appeared that the bill merely adopted 
existing case law.164  Commentators believed that uncertainty brought about by 
vague language in the initial draft of the bill would accomplish little but to 
chill innovation.165  Because the definition “is not simple, clear or 
predictable. . . . [A] too-broad definition of inducement may impose a 
dangerous burden to development of and investment in useful and beneficial 
technologies to the detriment of U.S. competitiveness.”166 
b. Following Patent Law Standards of “Intentional Inducement” Would 
Bring About More Certainty 
The Supreme Court relied on patent law when constructing the substantial 
non-infringing use test of Sony, and many commentators believe that Congress 
should continue to refer to patent law when attempting to correct the problems 
with the current law as applied to P2P networks.167  Andrew Greenberg of the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, in his congressional testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated: 
For example, the standard of “intentional inducement” does not appear to 
require actions independent of lawful marketing of features of a technology 
capable of both infringing and noninfringing uses; does not appear to require 
knowledge that the acts were induced to find an infringement; and does not 
appear to require a subjective specific intent to induce the infringing acts.168 
 
 161. The Intentional Inducement of Copyrights Act of 2004: Hearing on S. 2560 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2560] (statement of 
Andrew Greenberg, Vice-Chairman, Intellectual Property Committee of the Institute of Electrical 
and Electronics Engineers-United States of America). 
 162. Id. (statement of Kevin McGuiness, Executive Director and General Counsel, Net 
Coalition). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. (statement of Andrew Greenberg). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Hearings on S. 2560, supra note 161. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
872 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:851 
Adopting patent law standards that have been interpreted by the courts adds a 
certain amount of predictability that is important to technology developers 
when designing a new product, which critics say has been ignored by the 
Induce Act.169 
c. The Induce Act Could Create an Inordinate Amount of Litigation 
Since this bill adopted a reasonable person standard, courts may be 
reluctant to dismiss a case in order to allow a plaintiff an opportunity for 
discovery.170  “Although intentional inducement standard in the bill might 
sound like a difficult standard to meet, it does not require proof that the 
defendant actually intended to induce infringement.  Rather, the defendant[‘]s 
intent can be inferred, culled from literally any document within the 
defendant[‘]s possession.”171 
Not only will it be more difficult to convince a court to dismiss a claim 
under this bill, the Induce Act could also open up many other parties to 
potential liability.172  “Under this bill, anyone who can be considered to be 
aiding, abetting, procuring, or inducing someone to engage in copyright 
infringement is subject to liability. . . . [V]enture capitalists [and] credit card 
companies . . . could find themselves the target of litigation.”173 
d. The Induce Act Attempts to Overturn Sony 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
Studios, Inc. is the “tech industry’s Magna Carta. . . . It gives security to 
venture capitalists that they can invest in new technologies without being sued.  
It is responsible for the burst of tech innovation we’ve seen in the past 20 
years.  This bill would change all that.”174  Some from the software distributor 
camp believed that Sony would not have been liable for contributory 
infringement, but could have been found to have induced infringement.175 
Proponents of the bill disagree with this analysis.  The copyright holders 
insist that since the “inducement” language is taken from the Patent Act, courts 
would look to rulings under the Patent Act.176  “Knowing that some customers 
are going to infringe isn’t enough to establish inducement . . . [a] seller must 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Hearings on S. 2560, supra note 161 (statement of Kevin McGuiness). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Steve Seidenberg, Senate Bill Puts Power in Hands of Copyright Owners, CORP. LEGAL 
TIMES, Sept. 2004, at 16 (quoting Michael Petricone, vice president of technology policy for the 
Consumer Electronics Association). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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communicate in some way that you can use the machine for an infringing 
purpose.”177 
2. Copyright Office Draft 
After the initial congressional hearing, extensive media coverage and 
increased lobbying influenced the Copyright Office to issue a revised draft 
aimed to appease both sides of the debate.178  The Copyright Office operated 
under the main assumption, which it perceived as legislative intent, that the bill 
should be technology-neutral and impose liability based on the circumstances 
in which the technology is used.179  The language employed should also 
provide an effective cause of action against those services that have escaped 
liability through the court’s interpretation of the current law.180  As previously 
mentioned, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Grokster, and the resulting 
discontent of the copyright holder lobby, was one of the main motivations for 
this bill.181  To satisfy the innovators, the Copyright Office draft was structured 
to only target technology that does intentionally induces others to infringe 
copyrights; recognizing that some technology has dual uses, these innovators 
should not be liable if the public uses their technology for illegal purposes.182  
If the first draft of the legislation was vague, which many opponents of the bill 
argued, the Copyright Office draft detailed more of the specifics of what it 
perceived to be the Senate’s intent.183 
The Copyright Office draft has four main subsections.  The first section 
highlighted three elements, one of which must be met to impose liability: 
Whoever manufactures, offers to the public, provides, or otherwise traffics in 
any product or service, such as a computer program, technology, device or 
component, that is a cause of individuals engaging in public dissemination of 
copyrighted works shall be liable as an infringer where such activity: (A) relies 
on infringing public dissemination for its commercial viability; (B) derives a 
predominant portion of its revenues from infringing public dissemination; or 
(C) principally relies on infringing public dissemination to attract individuals 
to the product or service.184 
In drafting the language of the bill, the Copyright Office, consistent with 
what it perceived as legislative intent, claimed to focus on the business model 
 
 177. Id. (quoting patent and copyright lawyer Ronald Clayton). 
 178. See Gigi B. Sohn, Radical Act Would Induce Big Chill, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at 
19. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See generally id. 
 183. See Sohn, supra note 178. 
 184. Explanatory Memorandum from Copyright Office, supra note 156. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
874 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:851 
surrounding the technology, rather than the behavior or technology itself.185  
This illustrates the reasoning behind the language of the first section, which 
specifically defined the infringing activities.  “Under this approach, there is no 
need for the courts to get into thorny questions about how a particular 
technology was designed, what its particular functions can or can’t do, or 
difficult questions of intent.”186  The Copyright Office attempted to classify a 
product or service as an inducer of infringement of copyrights according to the 
percentage of revenue that the particular product or service derives from the 
dissemination of copyrighted material.187 
Another doctrinally relevant phrase refers to products that are “a cause of 
individuals engaging in infringing public dissemination of copyrighted 
works.”188  One of the principal arguments of the innovators concerning the 
first draft of the bill was that it was too vague, and that no one could predict 
how the courts would interpret a term like “induce,” which, if misinterpreted, 
could chill innovation.189  The Copyright Office discarded the possibility of 
using the term “cause,” stating that “[p]redicating liability on whether the 
defendant ‘causes’ infringement could be interpreted as requiring that the 
defendant’s conduct be the proximate or ultimate cause of the infringement, 
which we rejected as too high a burden.”190 
The second subsection defined the term “public dissemination” as “digital 
transmission to the public of copies or phonorecords or any other exercise of 
any of the rights set forth in sections 106(3), 106(4), 106(5) or 106(6).”191  
Importantly, to allay the concern of the software distributors, “the mere 
infringement of the reproduction right or the derivative work right, without any 
of these additional elements, would not constitute ‘public dissemination’ [and 
could not] be used to target manufacturers and marketers of devices used for 
copying.”192 
Other concessions were made to the technology innovators in the third 
section of the Copyright Office draft, which discussed two possible remedies 
for those found to induce the infringement of copyrights: statutory damages 
and injunctions.193  Statutory damages are only available if the violation is 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (emphasis added). 
 189. Hearings on S. 2560, supra note 161 (statement of Andrew Greenberg). 
 190. Explanatory Memorandum from Copyright Office, supra note 156. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  The section states specifically: 
(A) No award of statutory damages under Section 504(c) shall be made for a violation of 
this subsection unless the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court 
finds, that such violation was committed willfully. (B) In granting injunctive relief under 
Section 502 for a violation of this subsection, the court shall, to the extent practicable, 
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found to be willful; however, even nonwillful violators would be liable for 
actual damages and lost profits.194  Further, the draft also addressed the 
concerns that the Induce Act would increase the amount of litigation to which 
software distributors would be subjected by making unsuccessful plaintiffs 
liable for the defendant’s attorney fees.195  An injunction, the second remedy, 
“must, where practicable fashion the scope of the injunction not to restrain or 
prevent the noninfringing uses of the product or service at issue. . . . [That is] a 
critical aspect of the Sony decision. . . .”196 
The final subsection of the Copyright Office draft attempted to preserve 
the settled law of the doctrine of secondary liability, as well as the established 
defenses.197  Again, trying to appease the innovators, this subsection attempted 
to save the Sony doctrine that appeared to be the deal-breaker for the 
innovators.198 
Nevertheless, this draft suffered the same fate as the original draft, as both 
sides were still wary of the unclear language.  Sen. Hatch, after realizing that 
the parties could not reach a compromise, asked the interested parties to 
propose acceptable language, and then left it to them to work out the details.199  
As imagined, the parties were unable to reach a compromise.200  “[T]he talks 
appeared to have collapsed because neither side could agree on how to achieve 
a balance between protecting technology companies from litigation for their 
products while, at the same time, outlawing file-sharing companies that profit 
from the illegal distribution of copyrighted works.”201 
3. Earlier Attempted Solutions to the P2P problem 
When Napster, the first notable P2P service, was publicly introduced in 
September 1999, it became immediately popular, with the number of users 
doubling every five or six weeks.202  In February 2001, Napster had 80 million 
users trading songs online.203  This massive distribution of copyrighted 
 
limit the scope of the injunctive relief so as not to prevent or restrain noninfringing uses of 
the product or service. 
Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Explanatory Memorandum from Copyright Office, supra note 156. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Sarah Lai Stirland, Talks Collapse in Effort to Reach Deal on File-Sharing Bill, 
CONGRESSDAILYAM, Oct. 7, 2004. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Matthew Green, Note, Napster Opens Pandora’s Box: Examining How File-Sharing 
Services Threaten the Enforcement of Copyright on the Internet, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 801 
(2002). 
 203. Id. at 802. 
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material was undoubtedly a major concern of the music industry, but the bigger 
concern was how to stop the illegal downloading.  Several artists spoke out 
against Napster, including Don Henley, Garth Brooks, Art Alexakis of 
Everclear, Elton John, and Puff Daddy.204  In December 1999, the Recording 
Industry Association of American (RIAA) brought litigation against 
Napster.205  In March 2000, Metallica and Dr. Dre soon followed with their 
own suits against Napster.206  However, the music industry could not ensure a 
solution by itself.  Acting on behalf of the music interests, the RIAA was 
joined by other stakeholders, including the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA), the Music Producers Guild (MPG), the Business Software 
Alliance (BSA), and other parties who had an interest in keeping property 
rights from being infringed upon by internet users.207 
Nevertheless, the Induce Act was not the first piece of legislation aimed at 
curbing the illegal downloading of copyrighted material over P2P networks.  In 
1998, in response to the fears of Internet service providers (ISPs) concerning 
their liability for the direct copyright infringement of their users, Congress 
enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).208  In this legislation, 
Congress identified “safe harbors” for these ISPs, but only “to the extent that 
the infringement involves four functions: transitory network transmissions, 
caching, storage of materials on behalf of users (e.g., web hosting, remote file 
storage), and the provision of information location tools (e.g., providing links, 
directories, search engines).”209 
Generally, the DMCA strengthened copyright protection by prohibiting the 
“circumvention of copy-protection technologies” and the distribution of 
information detailing how to overcome those technologies.210  Some believed 
that the safe harbors constructed within the DMCA could be undermined by 
the Induce Act.211  “While these limits would continue to apply with respect to 
the services offered by ISPs . . . under [the Induce Act], an ISP could be sued 
for inducing infringement by distributing software that enables infringement, 
such as software enabling broadband services.”212  Nevertheless, most of the 
law revolving around secondary liability of copyright infringement is case 
 
 204. Id. at 803. 
 205. Reuters, Metallica Raps Napster, Mar. 29, 2001, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/ 
03/29/archive/technology/main282384.shtml. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Green, supra note 202, at 804. 
 208. Elliot M. Zimmerman, P2P File Sharing: Direct and Indirect Copyright Infringement, 
FLA. B. J., May 2004, at 40, 41; see Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 209. Zimmerman, supra note 208, at 41. 
 210. Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 911 (2004). 
 211. Hearings on S. 2560, supra note 161 (statement of Kevin McGuiness). 
 212. Id. 
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developed, and few pieces of legislation have attempted to modify it until the 
proposal of the Induce Act.213 
Other proposed legislation attempted to solve the problem of illegal file-
sharing over P2P networks.  In 2002, Rep. Howard Berman introduced the 
“P2P Piracy Prevention Bill,”214 which was “essentially a self-help provision 
that would have allowed a copyright owner to use technology to deter or 
prevent the unauthorized use of her works over the internet, so long as the 
owner did not significantly impair the unauthorized user’s computer.”215  
Predictably, the bill was received well by copyright owners but vigorously 
opposed by the innovators and Internet users, as it gave copyright owners 
unprecedented self-help power, while offering very little protection for 
individual Internet users.216 
The Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act,217 introduced in January 2003, 
would have mandated that CDs with copy protection be properly identified, as 
well as making sales of mislabeled, copy-protected CDs illegal.218  “The 
proposal serves the public access interests in the constitutional grant by 
enabling consumers to exercise their property interests as well as to create 
 
 213. 150 CONG. REC. S7189 (daily ed. June 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 214. H.R. 5211 pmbl., 107th Cong. (2002).  The bill specifically stated: 
A copyright owner shall not be liable in any criminal or civil action for disabling, 
interfering with, blocking, diverting, or otherwise impairing the unauthorized distribution, 
display, performance, or reproduction of his or her copyrighted work on a publicly 
accessible peer-to-peer file trading network, if such impairment does not, without 
authorization, alter, delete, or otherwise impair the integrity of any computer file or data 
residing on the computer of a file trader. 
Id. at § 1(a)(a). 
 215. Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive Peer-to-Peer?, 26 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 371, 398 (Summer 2003). 
 216. Id. at 400. 
 217. H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 218. The Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act details: 
[A] prerecorded digital music disc product shall be considered mislabeled if it 1) bears 
any logo or marking, which, in accordance with common practice, identifies it as an audio 
compact disc; 2) fails to bear a label on the package in which it is sold at retail in words 
that are prominent and plainly legible on the front of the package that—A) it is not an 
audio disc; B) it might not play properly in all devices capable of playing audio compact 
discs; and C) it might not be recordable on a personal computer or other device capable of 
recording content from an audio compact disc; or 3) fails to provide the following 
information on the packaging which it sold at retail in words that are prominent and 
plainly legible— A) any minimum recommended software requirements for playback or 
recordabilty on a personal computer; B) any restrictions on the number of times song files 
may be downloaded to the hard drive of a personal computer; and C) the applicable return 
policy for consumers who find that the prerecorded digital music disc product does not 
play properly in a device capable of playing an audio compact disc. 
Id. at § 24A(c). 
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technologies that serve non-infringing purposes.”219  Both of these bills were 
referred and eventually stalled out in the House Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property.220 
C. Market Solutions 
Even though prior legislation had not been incredibly successful in 
stemming illegal file-sharing, the RIAA and other copyright owners had 
employed other means to protect against copyright infringers.  Possible 
market-related solutions included the education of the file-sharing public, the 
increased use of copy-protection techniques, and the alteration of the business 
model to attract those users who want to possess cheap digital files. 
The RIAA’s purpose in launching an education campaign was to educate 
consumers on the negative impact of pirating music.221  The RIAA’s Web site 
displayed anti-piracy quotes from a wide variety of artists, while some artists 
even took education into their own hands.222  “[T]he Dixie Chicks and Missy 
Elliot have appeared on MTV and BET to relay artists’ concern.  Even 
Madonna chastised her fans for downloading an illegal copy of her new single, 
American Life.”223  At the 2004 GRAMMY Awards, the Recording Academy 
unveiled a major education campaign, which included a new Web site entitled 
“whatsthedownload.com,” various print and radio advertisements, grassroots 
activities, and retail appearances.224  Music United for Strong Internet 
Copyright, another group advocating the protection of intellectual property 
rights, purchased educational advertisements in newspapers and secured a 
series of radio and television commercials featuring artists discussing the 
negative impacts of illegal file-sharing.225 
The mass number of lawsuits filed by the RIAA against individual file-
sharers also served to further educate the public, although inadvertently.226  If 
the passive file-sharer was previously unaware of the intricacies of copyright 
law, and thought Napster was merely an affordable way to build a music 
collection, surely the thousands of lawsuits filed enlightened even the least 
 
 219. Rebekah O’Hara, You Say You Want a Revolution: Music & Technology—Evolution or 
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 220. Id. at 285. 
 221. Norman, supra note 215, at 403. 
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legal-savvy Internet user.  According to a July 2004 survey, it appeared that the 
education efforts had been successful: “64 percent of those surveyed believed 
it is illegal to make music from the computer available for others to download 
for free.”227  In fact, the Internet traffic related to P2P applications decreased 
by almost 50% on university networks.228 
The recording industry also explored increased copy-protection on the 
media itself.  After observing the positive effects copy-protection technology 
had on the pirating of DVDs, the recording industry began to experiment with 
its own version of copy-protection technology.229  These methods, however, 
are quite controversial as they would not allow consumers to make copies of 
purchased media, even for personal use.230  Another possible copy protection 
method is encryption, where only a person who has a “key” can gain access to 
the media file.231  Still another method would allow the files to be identified 
through the use of a digital watermark or fingerprint, which would allow the 
copyrighted material to be controlled and located and could prevent infringing 
files from being swapped over P2P networks.232 
Commentators have also proposed an alteration of the business models of 
copyright owners, which have included special materials or features in a retail-
bought CD, thus making pirated products less valuable, or possibly the creation 
of commercial P2P networks, which in fact is currently being utilized.233  
There have been a number of successful business models based on the sale of 
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MP3s on the Internet.234  “[A] full 3 percent of Internet users and 17 percent of 
music downloaders now currently use paid music services.  Some 7 percent of 
the user population admits to buying music from these services at one point or 
another.”235 
D. Judicial Solutions 
The copyright holders were successful in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., where the court enjoined Napster from “engaging in, or facilitating others 
in copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs’ 
copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings, protected by either 
federal or state law, without express permission of the rights owner.”236  
However, the damage was already done, as new P2P software was already 
developed, designed to circumvent the judicially constructed law in Napster.  
New networks appeared that conformed to Napster and attempted to resist 
litigation by shifting the liability from the network owners to the individual 
infringers.237  To add further urgency to the problem, the RIAA reported that 
the industry lost $4.2 billion in 2001, and the BSA estimated a loss to the 
industry of $10.97 billion in 2001.238 
Frustrated by the inability of the judicial system to limit the P2P software, 
the RIAA decided to start suing individual users.  In April 2003, RIAA filed 
suit against four university students, who quickly settled, and followed that 
success with suits against 261 more individuals in September of 2003.239  
 
 234. For a thorough discussion of the intricacies of alternative business models, see DEREK 
SLATER ET AL., HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, CONTENT AND CONTROL: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 
POLICY CHOICES ON POTENTIAL ONLINE BUSINESS MODELS IN THE MUSIC AND FILM 
INDUSTRIES, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu /media/files/content_control.pdf. 
 235. Michael A. Einhorn, Music in the Crucible: A Year in Review, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 
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see Hindo, supra note 228 (“[I]n 2003 CD album sales slipped 2%––a less dramatic drop than the 
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While 65% of users say downloading led them to not purchase an album, 80% claim they 
bought at least one album after first sampling it on a file sharing network. . . . While 
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Id. at 3–4. 
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However, in December 2003, the RIAA’s lawsuits suffered a significant 
setback.  In Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet,240 
the RIAA’s use of the DMCA to issue subpoenas was held invalid when 
applied to entities such as ISPs.241  While this did not completely derail 
RIAA’s judicial efforts, it certainly made it more expensive.  “The RIAA 
would have to file a ‘John Doe’ lawsuit against each anonymous swapper, a 
process that would be considerably more labor-intensive and time-consuming.  
That in turn could limit the number of people the association ha[d] the 
resources to pursue.”242  Nevertheless, the RIAA has sued over 1,900 
individual users, with each paying an average of $3000 in fines.243  While it 
appeared that the RIAA was making progress, there was still a lack of 
enforcement of copyright law, as the RIAA simply could not sue every 
individual who illegally downloaded copyrighted files.  “The reach of peer-to-
peer file sharing is enormous, and the attempt to stop millions of people from 
file sharing through the use of the court has an enormous scope.”244 
The RIAA was unsuccessful in pursuing several legislative alternatives;245 
was unsuccessful in the judicial arena,246 as the filing of individual lawsuits 
became increasingly expensive; and was generally unsuccessful in its efforts to 
utilize the market for solutions.  The copyright holders thus had little choice 
but to continue its pursuit of P2P software, like Grokster and Napster, by 
persuading legislators to introduce the Induce Act.  Sen. Hatch, who along with 
other co-sponsors of the bill, received significant campaign contributions from 
the TV, music, and media industries,247 had been a longtime supporter of artist 
rights and is himself a songwriter and a performer.248  The Ninth Circuit’s 
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decision allowed Hatch to further push one of his “pet” projects into the 
limelight, leading to the introduction of the Induce Act. 
However, as outlined above, the Induce Act never made it out of 
committee.  In an attempt to appease both sides of the debate, the committee 
and Copyright Office ended up pleasing neither.  These two camps, 
represented each by a conglomeration of groups and individuals bound by a 
common goal, albeit against one another, wielded enormous power in this 
debate, which eventually led to the demise of the proposed legislation. 
IV.  COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
In order to conduct a comparative institutional analysis, a policy goal must 
first be chosen so the various institutions can be examined through their ability 
to promote that chosen goal.249  “To consider institutional choice in depth, 
however, one must simplify the social policy goal discussion by assuming the 
goal rather than providing a detailed proof.”250  While not taking the social 
policy goal for granted, it seems rather constitutionally straightforward, to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”251  This comparative 
institutional analysis, when translated with a public choice slant, suggests a 
social policy goal of “enabling cost-efficient innovation.”252 
A. Group Formation 
An interest group is “an organization of people with similar policy goals 
who enter the political process to try to achieve those aims . . . . A policy battle 
lost in Congress may be turned around when it comes to bureaucratic 
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implementation or the judicial process.”253  Even though there are many 
distinct groups within this struggle to adapt copyright law, like the RIAA, 
MPAA, and BSA, it is simpler to view all these groups as a single group 
lobbying toward a common goal of the protection of copyrights.254  The 
combination of the software distributors, Internet service providers, civil 
liberty advocates, and Internet users combine to oppose legislation that may 
extend the copyright monopoly to the extent that innovation is inhibited.255  
Joining the ranks of the software distributors256 are the Internet users, 
described as “new grass roots and lobbying organizations advocat[ing] for 
consumer and Internet user rights with respect to privacy, intellectual property, 
and free speech . . . . these organized actors will likely push the equilibria of 
the substantive laws closer to outcomes that benefit Internet users.”257  This is 
significant because of the large numbers of individuals who belong to this 
informal group.  “[T]he millions of users of peer-to-peer networks obviously 
place value on their ability to access content that they might otherwise have 
purchased . . . consist[ing] of . . . arguably the largest international networks of 
illegality in human history.”258 
Despite their advancement of an arguably illegitimate political interest,259 
this network of Internet users, forming a loosely knit group advocating privacy 
and speech rights, invariably subsidized the power of the software 
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2005, 
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 257. Aaron Burstein, Will Thomas DeVries, & Peter S. Menell, Foreword: The Rise of 
Internet Interest Group Politics, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 15–16, 20 (2004). 
 258. Id. at 15–16 (citation omitted). 
 259. See Patrick Ross, File-Sharing Battles Leave Us Out, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 27, 2004,  
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distributors.260  Of particular interest was the rise of Web sites whose main 
agenda is to defeat the Induce Act.261  These groups, consistent with the tenets 
of pluralism, organized and rose to the occasion when an important issue 
appeared on the agenda of many legislators.  For example, in the first week of 
the “campaign,” more than 10,000 e-mails and faxes were sent to Congress 
demanding revision of the Induce Act.262  Another group recruited over 5,000 
volunteers to call members of Congress to express their discontent with the 
Induce Act.263  The Electronic Frontier Foundation, aligning with the software 
distributors, also recruited another 6,000 individuals to write their senators to 
express their discontent with the proposed legislation.264 
As to the groups advocating increased copyright protection, their well-
funded efforts translated into a legislative proposal by utilizing the same 
resources that ensured the attention of the issue in the first place and making its 
way onto the agenda of the legislature.  The apparent limitless coffers of these 
interests were used to form a strong organization that persuades members of 
Congress to vote for pro-copyright protection legislation.  However, the 
copyright protectors do not persuade with money alone, as the RIAA was also 
able to convince 3,000 of their members to e-mail their lawmakers.265 
It is apparent that these two coalitions of groups were competing to ensure 
the protection of their vested interests, either in rights, as with the software 
distributors and Internet users, or in copyrights, as with the copyright holders.  
They utilized their resources in an attempt to guarantee the preservation or 
reformation of the system to best capitalize on their respective businesses. 
 
 260. See id. 
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B. The Legislative Institution 
As suggested by Komesar,266 the copyright holders, being a minority voice, 
and the Internet users and software distributors, invariably composed of more 
members, basically counteracted one another to the extent that the Induce Act 
failed, as the groups were unable to reach a compromise, especially when the 
legislators, out of frustration for the lack of movement on the bill, put the 
reconciliation process into the hands of these groups. 
This is indicative of “interest group liberalism”: “the role of government is 
one of insuring access to the most effectively organized, and of ratifying the 
agreements and adjustments worked out among the competing leaders.”267  
Jessica Litman, in her book Digital Copyright, described the process as unique 
to the development of copyright law: 
About one hundred years ago, Congress got into the habit of revising copyright 
law by encouraging representatives of the industries affected by copyright to 
hash out among themselves what changes needed to be made and then present 
Congress with the text of appropriate legislation.  By the 1920s, the process 
was sufficiently entrenched that whenever a member of Congress came up 
with a legislative proposal without going through the cumbersome pre-
legislative process of multiparty negotiation, the affected industries united to 
block the bill.  Copyright bills passed only after private stakeholders agreed 
with one another on their substantive provisions.268 
These established processes tend to result in a legislative process that has 
certain characteristics.  First, the affected group will not support a bill that 
takes away certain rights that are granted by the current status of the particular 
law.269  Second, groups attempt to characterize the current status of the law in 
their favor, as the current law is where negotiations begin.270  If a group can 
cast the current copyright law in its favor, then it has more power at the 
bargaining table; if it appears that the group which the law favors is making 
concessions to the current law, and hence losing some sort of rights, then it is 
more likely to receive more of the rights that it favors in return.  Finally, these 
“negotiations tend to result in very specific and detailed rules that resolve the 
main concerns of the players at that stage of the industry’s history.”271 
These tendencies of the formation of copyright law follow logically from 
basic interest group theory, all of which aid in the understanding of the 
introduction and subsequent failure of the Induce Act.  First, according to 
 
 266. See supra text accompanying notes 75–76. 
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interest group liberalism, the role of government in the legislative process is to 
graft a compromise between competing groups, which is extremely similar to 
the process in which copyright law is formulated, as suggested above.272  
However, it appears that the process, as described above, was not followed in 
the early stages of the Induce Act.  Instead of consulting with the various 
groups that would be interested in this legislation, Hatch and Induce’s co-
sponsors neglected the large number of groups interested in this discussion.273  
“The fact is that no one really wants to hear from the P2P networks concerning 
IICA. The Induce Act will put P2P out of business, why bother giving them a 
seat at the table?”274  Further evidence of the lopsided involvement in the 
original drafting of the law was evident when Hatch thanked the Business 
Software Alliance for “its invaluable assistance in crafting a bill that protects 
existing legitimate technologies” during his introduction of the bill.275 
Eventually, many of the interested groups were brought into the 
discussion.276  Especially receptive to the various groups was the Copyright 
Office draft of the Induce Act, however, the sides were still too far apart on 
essential issues.277  As suggested above, these groups would not support a bill 
that significantly altered their rights under the current system.278 
A subsequent hurdle proved to be the uncertainty of the law, as these 
groups would continue to portray the current law as favorable to their 
interests.279  Relying on Grokster, Internet users could easily argue that certain 
P2P applications are not liable as infringers, as the Ninth Circuit ultimately 
ruled.280  Software distributors could point to Sony to support their contention 
that certain P2P applications are legal because of their substantial 
noninfringing use.281  Finally, the copyright holders could highlight Napster 
and In re Aimster to support their contentions that the P2P applications are 
being used for illegal purposes and should therefore be secondarily liable.282 
This confusion about the current status of the law is exactly why the 
copyright holders wanted to pass the legislation, however Induce’s opponents 
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wanted more discussion about the bill to ensure that Induce would not take 
away certain presently held rights, and therefore the parties were unable to 
reach a consensus on the proper language for the bill.283  There was not ample 
time in the legislative session to iron out the differences and enact the type of 
detailed bill that would be necessary to satisfy all the parties involved.284 
It is clear that both sides disposed of a large amount of resources during 
the short life of the Induce Act.  Discounting the possible effectiveness of the 
Induce Act in actually promoting innovation, which was highly disputed, the 
introduction of the Act, and all of the costs associated with it, was clearly not 
cost-effective.  The information costs to the copyright holders were quite 
high,285 as the copyright holders spent political capital in ensuring the 
introduction and wide-spread support of the bill,286 not to mention the time and 
labor that was devoted to the defense of the bill.  Although the transaction 
costs of the copyright holders were lower, as the free-rider problem was 
minimal because the groups were already formed and organized, the costs 
associated with the Induce Act were not proportional to the expected social 
benefit of promoting innovation.287 
While the information and transaction costs for the software distributors is 
similar to that of the copyright holders, the Internet users experienced 
relatively higher transactional and informational costs when attempting to 
influence this legislation.  The Internet users suffered from a free-rider 
problem, as the motivation for any individual internet user to actually lobby the 
government is relatively low, as all users are likely to receive the benefit or 
suffer the detriment of the legislation regardless of their involvement.288  The 
costs of participating and the expected benefit from such participation is 
similar to that of casting a vote.  A rational actor does not believe that his vote 
actually makes a significant difference in the outcome of an election; similarly, 
a rational Internet user probably does not believe that his lobbying efforts 
would have a real effect on the outcome of the legislative battle.  The costs of 
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organizing and reaching other interested Interent users were also rather high, as 
this group was not previously formally organized to fight such legislation. 
However, the Internet itself played a role in softening the blow of these 
high costs.  The rather effortless lobbying techniques employed by the Internet 
users, like sending an e-mail or posting on a message board, helped to defray 
the effect of the free-rider problem and the problem of the expected benefit 
from actually lobbying the government.  Once the individual was aware of the 
legislation and its potential repercussions, the experienced Internet user could 
express his political feelings without spending a lot of time or money.289  It is 
the relative ease of the Internet that allowed the Internet users to “spend 
enough” of their resources to cancel the copyright holders’ efforts.  Again, as 
Komesar had suggested, a well-organized and well-informed small group, like 
the copyright holders, will be more influential than a poorly organized and a 
poorly formed large group, like the Internet users.  However, when the Internet 
users, with the help of the software distributors, organized in such a manner as 
to increase their influence, “a countervailance of sorts between the two forces 
[resulted] and, with it, political outcomes that [we]re more ‘balanced.’”290 
Nevertheless, when examining the relative nominal effect of the Induce 
Act on the social policy goal of the promotion of cost-efficient innovation 
protection, and the many resources that were spent by the two groups, the 
legislative process did not appear to be the effective institution with which to 
achieve the social policy goal. 
C. The Judiciary 
As discussed, the copyright holders have used the judiciary for two main 
types of claims: copyright infringement against individual file-sharers and 
secondary copyright infringement against those software producers that 
facilitate file-sharing.  Both of these avenues, however, have high costs for 
both the plaintiff and defendant. 
Internet users, to avoid suits from the copyright holders, must first 
understand that file-sharing is an illegal form of copyright infringement, which 
was, at least until recently, a large information cost.  While the copyright 
holders have decided to shoulder a portion of the educational burden, there are 
still Internet users who do not realize that file-sharing is illegal.  Further, the 
transaction costs forced upon Internet users who were thrust into litigation are 
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also quite high; relative to the benefit received, as in possession of illegally 
downloaded music or movies, the costs of hiring a lawyer and paying a 
settlement are very high.  However, Internet users are not altogether deterred 
by these suits, as there is a free-rider problem, where not all Internet users who 
download pirated media are held accountable for their infringement.  
Therefore, many Internet users will continue to receive the benefit of 
copyrighted media, while not bearing any of the costs associated with 
litigation; as the possibility of being sued is fairly remote, the Internet users 
will generally continue to take advantage of the collective good of pirated 
media. 
The copyright holders also suffer from high transaction and information 
costs when utilizing the institution of the judiciary.  Transaction costs are high 
in almost any legal proceeding, as the many litigation costs continue to build 
over the life of the proceedings, which, especially when suing the P2P 
networks themselves, seem likely to be appealed several times, and sometimes 
on many different issues.291  The copyright holders’ information costs are also 
high when suing Internet users, as the “John Doe” subpoena process is 
significantly more expensive than the once relied-on power of subpoena found 
in the DMCA. 
Not only are the costs high, but the expected benefit does not really satisfy 
the social policy goal of encouraging cost-efficient innovation.  Any court 
adjudication is only based on the facts of the particular case, and these 
decisions do not promulgate rules which can be enforced without a subsequent 
lawsuit.  “[C]ourt rulings apply only to the parties involved in the specific 
litigation.  Stare decisis provides incentives for similarly situated actors to 
conform to the ruling, lest they be dragged into court, but such incentives are 
inadequate.”292  As seen with the evolution of P2P networks, the Grokster 
technology progressed after Napster so as not to fall under the specific facts 
that the court determined to be infringement. 
This maxim is also illustrated in the inevitable result of the Grokster ruling 
by the Supreme Court.  Even though the copyright holders arguably won the 
case, there is still much uncertainty as to the application of the Court’s 
“inducement” theory—uncertainty that will take time to resolve through its 
application by lower courts.293  Adding to the uncertain application of the 
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Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement, additional legislation by Congress is 
likely if the decision in Grokster ultimately harms technology companies or 
consumers.294 
The main benefit of litigation against Internet users is education, as the 
settlement received is usually nominal in relation to the costs related to the 
litigation.  Although education of Internet users of the negative effects of 
piracy is important, it can be, and certainly is, accomplished through other, less 
expensive means.  Overall, the nominal benefits received from litigation, when 
compared to the relative high costs of pursuing solutions in the judicial 
institution, do not effectively allocate resources to accomplish the goal of 
securing innovation.295 
D. The Market 
When a solution is sought within the institution of the market, the 
transaction and information costs are significantly less for the Internet users, 
and are spent in a manner that best furthers the social goal of encouraging 
innovation.  First, Internet users’ information costs are lower, as the copyright 
holders have decided to educate the Internet users, and, when properly 
advertised and targeted to the least knowledgeable Internet users, these 
messages would ideally affect the file-sharing population.  Internet users might 
take on additional information costs if they attempt to design software that 
circumvents certain copy-protected media, but this is probably negligible, as 
the technological savviness necessary to accomplish such methods is probably 
limited to a smaller percentage of Internet users, and will probably never be 
eliminated altogether.296  Internet users’ transaction costs are also limited, as 
the main cost will be the increased price of media, but these additional costs 
are merely a function of the increase in price from nothing to the current 
market value, and from a consumer’s perspective, should be expected. 
 
copyright law.”).  Questions such as “When will a tech company know whether it will be held 
responsible for the infringements of a third party user?” and “How can we protect innovators 
from the threat . . . of lawsuits based on uncertainties?” demonstrate such uncertainty.  Christine 
Mumford, Panelists Unable to Agree on Propriety of Legislative Involvement in Grokster’s Wake, 
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., July 22, 2005, at 362, 362 (quoting Fred von Lohmann of 
the Electronic Frontier Foundation). 
 294. See Alexei Alexis, Congress Expected to Examine Supreme Court File-Sharing Case, 
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., July 1, 2005, at 260. 
 295. Nevertheless, just days after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grokster, the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) filed another round of lawsuits, this time against 
other decentralized P2P networks such as BitTorrent and eDonkey.  Xeni Jardin, Hollywood 
Wants BitTorrent Dead, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 14, 2004, http://wired.com/news/digiwood/ 
0,1412,66034,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_2. 
 296. But see Ed Felten, Tiny P2P, http://freedom-to-tinker.com/tinyp2p.html (last visited Apr. 
10, 2006) (displaying the code for a “tiny” P2P application, to illustrate the simplistic nature of 
the code, noting that “any moderately skilled programmer can write one”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] INDUCING A REMEDY OR COURTING A SOLUTION? 891 
However, the transaction and information costs of copyright holders are 
still high, at least initially.  Developing either a new business model or 
technology that helps to ensure copyright protection will increase information 
costs.  The advertising campaigns used to educate Internet users also keep 
transaction costs high, with the success of such advertising depending on the 
relative knowledge of the consumer.  Nevertheless, transaction costs will most 
likely slowly decrease with a new business model, which utilizes the Internet, 
as it would inevitably be less expensive than relying on retail establishments to 
peddle the goods of copyright owners.297  More importantly, these costs will 
lead directly to the social policy goal.  As the proposed restriction will be 
imposed only on media originating from copyright holders, other innovators 
will not have to be concerned with overbroad legislation or confusing court 
opinions.  By only modifying CDs and DVDs, and not developing a new form 
of liability like that found in the Induce Act, innovation itself will not be 
stifled.  Instead, file-sharing, being the targeted activity that these measures 
attempted to prevent, will decrease as the technologies become increasingly 
advocated for, advanced, and accepted.  In reality, while file-sharing might be 
moderately discouraged through market measures, the real hindrance to P2P 
file-sharing would be the increased difficulty in exchanging copyrighted 
material, making it less desirable to the rational actor. 
Through the use of the market, Internet users might lose their ability to 
gain access to free music and movies, at least with the present ease, but 
software distributors will not be stifled or discouraged from releasing new 
programs and devices.  By stemming the reason for and the ease of file 
sharing, what could be possible “infringing” devices and programs could be 
used solely for their “substantially non-infringing use,” and at the same time 
not stifle innovation. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The American legislative process is not designed for efficiency.  The 
American judicial system is not designed to promulgate effective, enforceable 
rules to cure social ills.  In fact, influencing either of these institutions has 
certain built-in costs with unpredictable benefits.  Copyright legislation, 
because of its intricacies and intimate involvement in many markets, inevitably 
has many suitors.  It is exactly because of the number of interests, their fervor 
for their positions, and the vast amount of money at stake that these interests 
often clash, thus resulting in more gridlock.  Copyright litigation, while not 
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necessarily subject to group pressure, does not cast a wide net, and only affects 
the parties in the lawsuit.  While groups certainly play a role in adjudications, 
as a wealthy litigant could assemble a large and talented legal team, thus 
making resolution more difficult, the rule of law governs more in the judicial 
system, which is virtually impossible to change without help from judicial 
confusion and the subsequent perversion of current law. 
The market, however, is less subject to group pressure.  Copyright holders 
are free to employ whatever business model or technology they desire, and the 
only guiding light is profitability.  In the market, Internet users merely turn into 
consumers.  Once the enemy of the copyright holder, they are now a highly 
desired commodity.  High costs of frequent litigation and tireless lobbying of 
Congress are discarded.  Nevertheless, there will undoubtedly be times, even 
when operating solely under the institution of the market, that access to the 
legislature or judiciary will be necessary.  However, these branches were not 
designed to merely rubber-stamp policy desires of only private interests; 
money and influence is often needed to succeed, and, as shown, sometimes 
even that is not enough.  However, in order for businesses to reshape their 
models in the digital age, the law must be settled and understood.298  
Unfortunately, a vicious cycle seems to be forming: For businesses to 
understand what they are trying to protect against, the lines of legality need to 
be drawn, as this will allow the copyright holders to propose market solutions 
that will enable protection of their copyrights while not discouraging 
innovation, but this cannot be done with any certainty until the institutions of 




 298. Unfortunately, with the Court’s recent decision in Grokster II, this might not be the case, 
as it will inevitably take lower courts precious time to understand and apply the law as suggested 
by the Court.  See Jeffrey D. Neuburger & Maureen E. Garde, What’s Left of Substantial 
Noninfringing Use After Grokster?, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J., Sept. 16, 2005, at 549, 
549 (“The court in Grokster left reconsideration of Sony ‘for another day.’  That leaves a 
substantial amount of confusion on just how the Sony test should be applied until that day 
arrives.”). 
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